Hot Rummy Tommy ...

The army has just issued a 700-page history on the first 18 months in Iraq. It is based on hundreds of interviews by military historians with top military leaders.

According to the Times, "A big problem ... was the lack of detailed plans before the war for the postwar phase, a deficiency that reflected the general optimism in the White House and in the Pentagon, led by then-Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, about Iraq’s future, and an assumption that civilian agencies would assume much of the burden."

That optimism flew in the face of countless warnings -- at the time -- from top Middle East experts about the possibility of civil war and the difficulty of managing the occupation of a state as complex and large as Iraq.

Another problem was the decision by General Tommy Franks (the lone general who bought Cheney and Rummy's plan for going to war with half the recommended troop levels) to downsize military command as soon as Saddam was toppled, at what proved to be the start and not end of the war. “The move was sudden and caught most of the senior commanders in Iraq unaware,” states the history, which adds that the staff for the new headquarters was not initially “configured for the types of responsibilities it received.” (read article

While the report no doubt focuses on the more positive "lessons learned," it seems to also underscore the degree to which battle and postwar plans were dictated by men who had never themselves served -- or by the one and only general willing to put aside his experience and know-how in order to curry their favor.